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Rezumat:  Raptul  Basarabiei  în  1812  a  constituit  rezultatul  direct  al  politicii 
expansioniste, promovată în Balcani de către Rusia şi Turcia în a doua jumătate a sec. al 
XVIII-lea – începutul sec. al XIX-lea. Etapa finală a războiului ruso-turc din 1806-1812 a fost 
influenţată de generalul M. I. Kutuzov. Demersul studiului constă în prezentarea activității lui 
M.  I.  Kutuzov  în  calitate  de  comandant  suprem  al  „armatei  din  Moldova”  şi  analiza 
impactului acţiunilor sale asupra Ţărilor Române. Sunt examinați principalii factori care au 
influenţat  traseul  socio-profesional  parcurs  de  Kutuzov  până  a  fi  numit  în  funcţia  de 
comandant  suprem. În  baza  memoriilor  şi  a  documentelor  epocii  s-a  reconstituit  portretul 
moral  al  lui  Kutuzov  şi  au  fost  reliefate  consecinţele  nefaste  ale  activităţii  sale  asupra 
autohtonilor.  Pentru  Ţările  Române  M.  I.  Kutuzov  a  fost  comandantul  suprem  al  armatei 
ruseşti  de  ocupaţie  care  a  jefuit  nemilos  populaţia  paşnică  şi  care  a  avut  o  contribuţie 
esenţială la dezmembrarea Moldovei.  
 
Abstract: The Rapt of Bessarabia in 1812 was a direct result of expansionary policy 
pursued by Russia and Turkey in the Balkans during the second half of the XVIII
th century – 
beginning of the XIX
th century. The last period of the Russo-Turkish War of 1806-1812 was 
influenced by M. I. Kutuzov, the supreme commander of the Russian army. The main objective 
of the study is to elucidate the activity of M. I. Kutuzov as the supreme commander of the 
„Moldovan Army” and to analyze the impact of his actions on the Romanian countries. The 
study analyzes the main factors which have influenced his socio-professional route until he 
was  appointed  as  supreme  commander.  According  to  memoirs  and  documents  from  that 
period the moral portrait of Kutuzov was reconstructed and the negative consequences of his 
activities for Romanians were outlined. M. I Kutuzov was nothing more than the supreme 
commander of the Russian army of occupation who robbed ruthlessly the Romanian Countries 
and who had an essential contribution to the dismemberment of Moldova.  
 
Résumé:  Le  Rapt  de  la  Bessarabie  en  1812  était le  résultat  direct  de  la  politique 
expansionniste, promu par la Russie et la Turquie aux Balkans dans la deuxième moitié du 
XVIIIe siècle – début du XIXe siècle. L'étape finale de la guerre russo-turque de 1806-1812 a 
été influencé  par  le  général M.  I.  Koutouzov.  Le  but  de l'étude  est  de  mettre  en  évidence 
l’activité  de  M.  I.  Koutouzov  comme  le  commandant  suprême  de  „l'armée  moldave”  et 
d'analyser  quel  est  l'impact  de  ses  actions  sur  les  Pays  Roumains.  Dans  cet  article  sont 
analysés  les  principaux  facteurs  qui  ont  influencé  la  trajectoire  socio-professionnelle  de 
Koutouzov avant d'être nommé comme le commandant suprême. Sur la base des mémoires et 
documents d’époque a été reconstitué le portrait moral de Koutouzov et ont été élevés les 270   Sergiu Cornea 
conséquences  néfastes  de  son  activité  pour  les  indigènes.  Pour  les  Pays  Roumains  M.I. 
Koutouzov n'était pas que le commandant suprême de l'armée d'occupation Russe qui a pillé 
impitoyablement la population pacifique et a joué un rôle déterminant dans le démantèlement 
de la Moldavie.  
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The Bucharest Peace Treaty, signed on May 16, 1812 ended the Russo-Turkish 
war  of  1806-1812,  one  of  the  longest  and  most  expensive  wars  for  Romanian 
countries. According to the estimates  made by A. Agachi, in the six years of war, 
Romanian countries provided material goods for the Russian army in the amount of 
110,057,245 lei. The numerous requisitions, taxes, abusive purchases are not included 
in this amount so it can be doubled without any exaggeration.
1 After the annexation of 
Bessarabia, from a theatre of military operations it became the main base of support 
and supply of Russian troops, which continued to march towards the Balkans.
2   
The signing of this treaty was an arbitrary act of expansion and conquest. Turkey, 
in defiance of international law, gave up the territory of a state that was in suzerainty 
relationship with it and, in fact, did not belong to Turkey. As a vassal of the Ottoman 
Empire, Moldova has not lost its quality of sovereign state, maintaining its national 
statehood, political, economic, legal, administrative, fiscal systems and religion.
3 
“The Russian Empire, without any historical, ethnic or political right” ripped 
off “half of Moldovan territory”
4 – in this way M. Kogălniceanu qualified the act of 
1812, showing his attitude of non-acceptance of the event. N. Titulescu mentioned 
that “Russian complicity to the violation of a contract from international law cannot 
create the right”.
5 Thus by signing the Treaty of Bucharest neither “Suzerain power” 
nor “protector one” have respected their obligations towards Moldova. 
                                                           
1 Alexei Agachi, Ţara Moldovei şi Ţara Românească sub ocupaţia militară rusă (1806-1812) 
[Moldovan  and  Romanian  Country  under  Russian  military  occupation].  Chişinău,  Ed.: 
Pontos, 2008, p.353-356.  
2  Anatol  Leşcu,  Regiunea  pruto-nistreană  în  contextul  politicii  externe  ruse  din  secolele 
XVIII-XIX. Aspecte istorico-militare [The Pruto-Dniester region in the context of Russian 
external policy of XVIII
th-XIX
th centuries]. in: „Revista militară”, nr.2(4), 2010, pp.59. 
3 Dumitru Grama, Evoluţia statutului juridic al Basarabiei în anii 1812-1818 [The evolution 
of  legal  status  of  Bessarabia  during  the  1812-1818  years].  in:  Revista  de  istorie  a 
Moldovei, 1994, nr. 2, p.62; Idem, Principatul Moldova – stat suveran sub protecţie [The 
Principality of Moldova - a sovereign state under protection]. in: „Revista de filosofie şi 
drept, 1998, nr. 2-3, p.43-46. 
4 Apud: C. Bodea, Bucovina: momente din drumul ei spre 1918 [Bukovina: moments of its 
way towards 1918 year]. in: „Academica”, 1992, nr. 26, p.1. 
5 Nicolae Titulescu, Documente confidenţiale [Confidential documents]. Bucureşti, 1992, p.83. Consequences of activity of the Supreme Commander                          271 
Taking into consideration the territorial Rapt in 1775, the ratio of the remaining 
territories of Moldova and those which were kidnapped is the following: Bucovina - 
10442 km
2 (11%), Bessarabia - 45,630 km
2 (48%), Moldova - 38,230 km
2 (41%).
6  
The  Rapt  of  Bessarabia  in  1812  was  a  direct  result  of  expansionary  policy 
pursued by Russia and Turkey in the Balkans during the second half of the XVIIIth 
century  –  beginning  of  the  XIXth  century.  In  a  note  written  by  the  Russian 
government to the Austrian Cabinet on July 21, 1823 it was stated that: “The Cabinet 
of St. Petersburg has already actively involved into internal affairs of Walachia and 
Moldova for 50 years. Our rights and powers of attorney in this regard are based on 
agreements with Ottoman Empire, a multi-annual-and numerous previous practices.
7  
The territory annexed by the Russians was 7400 km larger than the territory to 
Moldova
8 and it brought important benefits to the Russian Empire. Tsar Alexander I, 
during the manifest of August 5th 1812, asserted: “This peace given to us by God, 
brought  brilliant  benefits  to  Russian  Empire,  including  in  its  boundaries  a  well-
populated and fertile land which extends from Akkerman till the mouths of the Prut 
River, being at a distance of 6 miles (nine versts) from Iasi and from its mouths till 
the Cesarian border and thence to down of Dniester River, in total approximately 663 
miles  (1,000  verstes),  encompassing  its  most  famous  cities:  Hotin  Bender,  Chilia, 
Ismail, Akkerman and many other trade cities”.
9  
The last period of the Russo-Turkish War of 1806-1812 was influenced by M. 
I.  Kutuzov,  the  supreme  commander-in-chief  of  the  Russian  army.  Russian 
historiography from all times glorified Kutuzov for the fact that he has ended the 
war  until  Napoleon's  invasion  and  has  signed  the  peace  with  Turkey  on  terms 
beneficial for Russia.  
How  did  Russian  General  Kutuzov  succeed  to  become  remarkable  for 
Romanian  countries?  What  impact  did  Kutuzov  have  on  the  prosperity  of  the 
Romanian people? Due to what merits until now there are streets named after him and 
busts which immortalize his image? For example, in Ploiesti there is a street named 
                                                           
6 Vlad Mischevca, Moldova în raporturile internaţionale la începutul secolului al XIX (1802-
1812) [Moldova in international relations in the beginning of XIX
th century (1802-1812)]. 
Teza…, Chişinău, 1997, p.127. 
7 Внешняя политика России XIX и начала XX века [Russian Foreign Policy in XIX and the 
beginning of XXth century]. Серия вторая. Том. V. Москва: Наука, 1982, с.155. 
8 Ion Nistor, Istoria Basarabiei [The History of Bessarabia].- Chişinău,1991, p.179. 
9 Собрание высочайших манифестов, грамот, указов, рескриптов, приказов войскам и 
разных  извещений  последовавших  в  течении  1812,  1813,  1814,  1815  и  1816  годов 
[Collection  of  the  highest  manifestos,  charters,  decrees,  rescripts,  orders  to  troops  and 
different  notifications  followed  during  the  1812,  1813,  1814,  1815  and  1816  years].  В 
Санктпетербурге:  В  Морской  типографии,  1816, с.26-27.  (further:  Collection  of  the 
highest manifestos, charters, decrees, rescripts, orders to troops and different notifications 
followed during the 1812, 1813, 1814, 1815 and 1816 years) 272   Sergiu Cornea 
after  him, and a bust of  Kutuzov sculptured by  Michael Onofrei  is located in the 
Philanthropy hospital courtyard in Bucharest.
10 In Moldova, hitherto, in many cities, 
especially in the region of Transnistria and the Gagauz Autonomy there are streets 
named  after  Kutuzov.
11  There  was  a  district  called  Kutuzov  in  the  Republic  of 
Moldova until 1988.
12 
In  order  to  elucidate  in  a  more  veridical  way  the  status  of  Kutuzov  as  the 
commander in chief of the Moldovan army, it is important to clarify primarily how 
the Russian general was treated by senior Russian officers and which were the main 
factors of influence of the social- professional route passed until being appointed as 
the commander in chief, due to which qualities, virtues or deeds he rapidly advanced 
in military ranks of the Russian Empire. 
Over  the  years,  a  whole  army  of  Russian  image  makers,  and  especially  the 
Soviets had worked hard to polish the image of “saviour of the fatherland”.  
The appreciation of Kutuzov's image was determined by the period of country 
development  and  promoted  the  ideological  content  of  that  period.  The  Kutuzov 
appreciation  was  made  from  the  position  of  class  struggle  and  visions  of  country 
leaders. The soviet propaganda exploited the historical past in order to create the new 
man in the spirit of love for the socialist homeland. The soviet ideology had a critical 
approach to the image of Kutuzov in the '20s of XX century, presenting it positively 
during the 30's and exalting it in the 40's.
13 Beginning with 1947, the soviet historians 
have adopted as a methodological background Stalin's answer to the Colonel E. A. 
Razin’s letter
14 which stated: “Our genius army commander Kutuzov ... has destroyed 
Napoleon  and  his  army  using  carefully  prepared  counteroffensive.”  And  further: 
                                                           
10 It is considered that the location of Kutuzov's bust in hospital courtyard was due to the fact 
that he was one of the initiators of the hospital foundation. According to the reports of a 
contemporary, Kutuzov deplored the lack of medical institutions in the city at a ball given 
in honor of his arrival in Bucharest, after which he put his hand in pocket and took out a 
fist  full  of  coins  in  order  to  begin  a  subscription,  this  gesture  was  followed  the  other 
boyars. See: Alexandru G.  Galeşescu, Eforia spitalelor civile 1832-1932 [The Ephor of 
civil hospitals 1832-1932]. Bucureşti: Tipografia G. A. Lăzăreanu, 1899, p.656. 
11 In this context I mention that in Russia there are 96 cities where the streets are named after 
Kutuzov.  See:  О.  В.  Шульгина,  Д.  П.  Шульгина,  Топонимика  как  объект 
нематериального наследия, связанного с Отечественной войной 1812 года в России 
[Toponymy  as  intangible  heritage  related  to  the  Patriotic  War  of  1812  in  Russia]. 
http://www.e-notabene.ru/hr/article_351.html  (accessed in 23.10.2012) 
12 Ialoveni district was created in 1977 under Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet 
RSS Moldova, no. 9th of March 25, 1495, with the initial name of Kutuzov, changed later 
(1988) in the historical name of Ialoveni. 
13 М. В. Юдин, Образ фельдмаршала М. И. Кутузова в отечественной культуре ХХ в. 
[The image of Field Marshal M. I. Kutuzov in the national culture of the XX
th century]. 
http://evestnik-mgou.ru/vipuski/2012_4/stati/pdf/yudin.pdf.  (accessed in 14.10.2012) 
14 Published in Bolşevic, nr.3, 1947, p.7-8. Consequences of activity of the Supreme Commander                          273 
“Engels noted, inter alia, that the Russian generals during the year 1812, Gen. Barclay 
of Tolly would be the unique commander of army who deserves attention.
15 Certainly, 
Engels  was  wrong  because  Kutuzov  as  the  commander  of  army  stands  head  and 
shoulder above Barclay of Tolly”.
16  
After  this  propagandistic  impulse  the  efforts  of  soviet  historiography  were 
focused on the glorification of Kutuzov. The historical parallels were made between 
the withdrawal of the Red Army in 1812 and its failure in 1941. The idea of Stalin 
wisdom was confirmed, it was inspired by the brilliant theory of Kutuzov. 
The study of contemporary memoirs and documents show that Kutuzov seen 
by  the  contemporaries  differs  from  Kutuzov  –  the  icon  created  by  the  inventive 
imagination of Russian historiography and especially of the Soviet Union.  
M.  A.  Miloradovich  said  that  Kutuzov  was  devoid  of  military  capabilities 
considering  him as a petty and sordid courtier,  L.  L.  Bennigsen  - as an  incapable 
man
17 and P. I. Bagration regards him as a villain, able to betray for money.
18 F.V. 
Rostopcin painted a gloomy picture of Kutuzov in the following way: “This man was 
a great tattler, a notorious lecher, a liar, a rude person and cringing. In order to obtain 
the favors from the upper class he was ready to endure everything, to sacrifice all, 
without any complaint and due to the intrigues and servile behaviour he got always 
the goal to be employed exactly in the minute it was thought forgotten forever”.
19 
M. I. Kutuzov was born on September 5, 1745, the only son of General L. M. 
Kutuzov.  Kutuzov’s  mother  died  early  and  he  spent  his  childhood  with  his 
grandmother. As a child  he  was gentle, smart but peevish and irresponsible at the 
same time, lazy in learning, he was fond of sleeping and languishing.
20 This was the 
early life of Kutuzov. The Earl A. Langeron knew Kutuzov in the last years of his life 
and characterized him in following way: “...He is endowed with so much spirit, but 
with so little character so that all things expected from his qualities were paralyzed by 
his  defects.  His  selfishness  was  more  revolting.  Everything  is  subordinated  to  his 
infamous pleasures and comfort.”
21 
                                                           
15 К.  Маркс, Ф. Энгельс, Сочинения [Essays] (2-е издание), Том 14. М.: Издательство 
политической литературы, 1959, c.94. 
16 Apud: Н. А. Троицкий, Отечественная война 1812 г. История  темы [The Patriotic 
War of 1812. A History of the Subject]. Саратов, 1991, p.47. 
17  Из  воспоминаний  А.  И.  Михайловского-Данилевского  [From  the  memoirs  of  A. 
Mikhailovsky Danilevsky]. In: Русская старина, 1897, № 6, c.466-467. 
18 Ф. В. Ростопчин, Записки о 1812 годе [F.V. Rostopchin, Notes of 1812 year]. In: Русская 
старина, 1889, № 12, c.693. 
19 Ibidem, p.694. 
20 А. И. Михайловский-Данилевский, Император Александр I и его сподвижники в 1812, 
1813, 1814, 1815 годах [The Emperor Alexander I and his associates in 1812, 1813, 1814, 
1815 years]. Т.3. СПб., 1846, c.1-2. 
21  Călători  străini  despre  Ţările  Române  în  secolul  al  XIX-lea  [Foreign  Travelers  about 
Romanian Countries in the XIX
th century]. Serie nouă, Vol. I (1801-1821). Bucureşti, Ed. 274   Sergiu Cornea 
According to the memoirs of his contemporaries, Kutuzov was known as the 
embodiment of three distinctive qualities: a) skilful courtier, b) plotter and double-
dealer,  c)  incurable  lecher.  His  military  career  and  social  progress  were  largely 
achieved due to these “virtues”. 
Kutuzov succeeded to be noticed and accepted in the entourage of Catherine II 
and her successor Paul I. It is noteworthy that Kutuzov was among the guests invited 
at dinner in the evening that preceded the death of both monarchs.
22 
In the last period of the reign of Catherine II, her favourites practiced a system 
of promotion based on protectionism in the Russian army. A large part of the generals 
had  permanently  lived  in  Moscow  or  Petersburg  and  were  more  concerned  with 
personal  issues  than  those  of  the  army.  Many  generals  and  senior  officers  of  the 
Russian  army  used  their  subordinates  systematically  for  personal  purposes.  The 
abuses had reached such proportions that senior officers treated military service as a 
profitable business.
23 
When  Kutuzov  returned  from  Constantinople  in  1794,  he  had  got  special 
abilities  in  preparing  coffee,  acquired  in  Turkey.  Having  this  ability  he  prepared 
coffee  by  a  special  recipe  to  P.  Zubov,  a  favourite  of  Catherine  II,  and  had  just 
brought to him with an hour before he woke up under the public gaze.
24  
As  a  result  of  these  flattering  efforts,  Kutuzov  was  appointed  as  the 
commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of Finland and of the Corps of cadets of the 
ground troops.  
In Russian society “Kutuzov's coffee pot” signified the superlative degree of 
flattery,  and  Kutuzov  was  called  “the  coffee  pot  of  P.  Zubov”.  The  Russian  poet 
Alexander Pushkin, analyzing the ways in which Catherine II subjugated the Russian 
nobility, claimed that this activity  was aided by  her favourites. “It is  necessary to 
remember,  Pushkin  wrote,  about  the  palms  offered  generously  to  our  Princes  and 
Boyars by the favourites, about Potemkin's ill-famed receipt, kept so far in a state 
institution,  about  the  monkey  of  Count  P.  Zubov,  about  the  coffee  pot  of  Prince 
Kutuzov and other facts”.
25 
Kutuzov  wanted his actions to be  heard and to  have  much resonance in the 
court  of  Tsar.  Kutuzov  began  to  tremble  while  hearing  the  name  of  the  Court, 
                                                                                                                                                         
Academiei Române, 2004, p.354 (Further: Călători străini despre Ţările Române ...). 
22  Н.  А.  Троицкий,  Фельдмаршал  Кутузов:  Мифы  и  факты  [Field  Marshal  Kutuzov: 
Myths and Facts]. Москва: Центрполиграф, 2002, c. 74, 90. 
23 Л. П.  Богданов, Русская армия в 1812 году [Russian army in 1812]. М.:  Воениздат, 
1979, с.13-14. 
24  Русский  биографический  словарь  [Russian  Biographical  Dictionary].  Жабокритский-
Зяловский. Петроград, 1916, с.533. 
25 А. С. Пушкин, Заметки по русской истории XVIII в [Remarks to the Russian  history 
XVIII]. In: А. С. Пушкин, Полное собрание сочинений в 10 т [Complete Works in 10 
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confirmed Langeron.
26 In a letter to his wife on October 29, 1811 Kutuzov confessed 
about his worries that he has not yet received any news from Tsar about the victorious 
fight of October 2, 1811.
27  
Langeron stated in his memoirs that Kutuzov liked to use small matters, sordid 
intrigue, etc.
28 P. V. Ciceagov sustained that: “this General used the intrigue as the 
main affair of his life”.
29 Kutuzov’s qualities of intriguer were fully manifested in his 
detachment  to the army in  Moldova in spring of 1808. A. A. Prozorovski,  having 
trouble  with  his  health,
30  requested  to  Tsar  to  be  sent  as  Deputy  M.  I.  Kutuzov, 
appreciating him as: “He is nearly my disciple and he knows my method”.
31 
According to the rescript of Alexander  I of  March 4, 1808,  Kutuzov  had to 
resign his post, and to move with his the 8
th and 22
nd divisions to the Moldovan Army, 
commander  in  chief  of  which  was  A.  A.  Prozorovski.  M.  I.  Kutuzov  reported  to 
Alexander I that he set out from Kiev to Iasi on April 5, 1808, where the location of 
Moldovan  army  general  headquarters  was  situated,  where  he  arrived  on  April  20, 
1808, as stated the order of Field Marshal A. A. Prozorovski.
32 
Kutuzov  was  involved  in  organization  of  intrigues  even  at  his  coming,  in 
order to take the position of A. A. Prozorovski. Although Kutuzov reported to his 
wife on May 2, 1808 that he is on good terms with A. A. Prozorovski
33, the reality 
was different. The Count A. H. Benkendorf described the relationships between M. 
I. Kutuzov and A. A. Prozorovski in the following way: “Prozorovski weakened due 
to his advanced age, and Kutuzov, eager to be commander in chief, suspected him. 
They were more occupied with intrigues than with military operations. The siege of 
Braila  fortress  ended  with  heavy  losses,  but  to  no  avail.  Field  Marshal  accused 
Kutuzov for this state of things, but Kutuzov hoped that because of this failure the 
count Prozorovski will be revoked and he will stand at the head of the army. But 
Imperator  decided  otherwise:  to  end  the  humiliating  clashes  he  appointed  Count 
Bagration in place of Kutuzov”.
34 
                                                           
26 Călători străini despre Ţările Române ..., p.351.  
27 М. И. Кутузов. Письма. Записки [M.I. Kutuzov. Letter. Notes]. М.: Воениздат, 1989, c.264 
28 Călători străini despre Ţările Române ..., p.351. 
29 Ibidem, p.543. 
30 He was 75 years old at the time of his appointment as commander in chief of Moldova 
(September, 1807). 
31 М. И. Кутузов. Сборник документов [M. I. Kutuzov: Compilation of Documents]. Том 
II. Москва, 1951, c.464. 
32 Фельдмаршал Кутузов. Сборник документов и материалов [Field Marshal Kutuzov: a 
Compilation  of  Materials  and  Documents].  Москва,  1947,  c.100-101;  М.  И.  Кутузов. 
Сборник  документов  [M.  I.  Kutuzov:  Compilation  of  Documents].  Том  II.  Москва, 
1951, c. 492, 498, 523. 
33 М.И. Кутузов. Сборник документов [M. I. Kutuzov: Compilation of Documents]. Том III 
(1808–1812). Москва, 1952, c.10. 
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A.  A.  Prozorovski  insisted  upon  the  revocation  of  Kutuzov  during  the 
campaign in spring of 1809, especially after the failure of storming the Braila fortress. 
A. A. Prozorovski reported to Alexander I that Kutuzov incited the officers to distrust 
him,  defamed  his  actions  and  this  situation  creates  obstacles  for  him  rather  than 
benefits,  insisting  to  be  revoked.
35  Considering  the  A.  A.  Prozorovski's  request, 
Alexander I ordered the drafting of rescript through which Kutuzov was appointed as 
the commander of Moldovan corps reserve.  
Due to the resignation of the General Rimsky-Korsakov as military governor of 
Lithuania,  there  was  drawn  the  second  rescript  by  which  Kutuzov  was  appointed 
instead of the last.
36 Both rescripts were sent to A. A. Prozorovski and  he should 
decide which of them to present to Kutuzov. Obviously, A. A. Prozorovski, wanting 
to escape the intrigues of Kutuzov, handed to Kutuzov the second rescript.
37 General 
P.  I.  Bagration  was  appointed  instead  of  Kutuzov,  on  July  25,  1809,  as  the 
commander of the main body of Moldovan Army.
38  
An  extreme  manifestation  of  cynicism  and  malevolence  was  the  case  of 
Kutuzov’s vengeance upon P. V. Ciceagov for the negative emotions caused by the 
appointment of Ciceagov as the commander in chief of Moldova and because he has 
revealed the numerous abuses and frauds which have occurred in the Moldovan Army. 
As the supreme commander of the Russian army, Kutuzov was complaining to 
Alexander I that P. V. Ciceagov did not provide him the information on his activities 
and directions of movement of the army commanded by him.
39 The culmination of 
Kutuzov's revenge was the way of how Kutuzov has exposed P. V. Ciceagov while 
Napoleon  crossed  over  the  river  Berezina.  About  this,  Denis  Davydov  reported: 
“Kutuzov, in turn, wanting to avoid the clash with Napoleon and his bodyguard, did 
not pursue persistently the enemy and remained far behind. This didn’t prevent him to 
announce P. V. Ciceagov about his appearance in the enemy rear-guard. Being signed 
retroactively, the Kutuzov’s disposals had arrived with delay to the admiral. P. V. 
Ciceagov often chastised the couriers but they answered him that they were sent from 
headquarters much later than the dates indicated in the disposals and, in fact, they 
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arrived to him in time.”
40  
Regarding  this  episode,  P.  V.  Ciceagov  has  communicated  to  Count  S.R. 
Voronţov on September 15, 1813: “... My biggest fault is that I arrived at the location 
indicated by the Emperor, while others who did not arrive there, have proved to be 
correct. Unfortunately, I have positioned myself so that during the military campaigns 
my army followed and attacked the enemy who stood before; this fact contradicts our 
new tactics, which state: «To win is to withdraw»”. P. V. Ciceagov insisted in his 
letter of May 25, 1813 to Count Vorontsov: “You must know that I have resigned not 
because  of  excessive sensitivity,  but  because  of  unfounded  claims  of  Marshal  K. 
(Kutuzov). He endeavoured to hinder all my actions, even if it was detrimental to his 
own glory ... I am accused of having committed some mistakes, but what did they 
consist of? Nobody told me. The main criticism is that I did not take Napoleon as the 
prisoner,  but  did  I  promise  this?  Did  I  get  such  kind  of  order?  Did  I  have  such 
assignment? Was this possible to do?”.
41 
During his lifetime and long military career, Kutuzov had a double behaviour. 
The same topic was addressed under different ways, depending on the person with 
whom he has interacted. Analyzing Kutuzov's correspondence two parallel attitudes 
emerge: on one side the fawning and patriotic tone used in official letters and selfish 
and opportunist, on the other side, used in correspondence with his family. 
In this regard,  Kutuzov's correspondence on  his possible appointment as the 
commander in chief of Moldova is interesting. Kutuzov was informed by the Minister 
of Tolly's M. B. Barclay about his possible appointment as the commander of the 
army of Moldova on February 23, 1811.
42 In a letter to his daughter Elizaveta from 
February 27, 1811, Kutuzov, while mentioning about his appointment as commander 
in chief of Moldova, stated: “I assure you I am not happy of the appointment, on the 
contrary, it grieves me, I swear. The Minister prepares me for this appointment. But I 
keep it a secret and tell you this. Never disclose this news until it will be published. 
And if, fortunately, it will be cancelled, then, generally do not talk about it. Someway 
or another, this detachment, mentioned above, worries me deeply. At my years to split 
out from my friends, abilities and tranquility!”
43 But in the official correspondence 
the tone of speaking was different, in the address to the Minister of Tolly M. Barclay 
dated on March 1, 1811, Kutuzov noted that “the trust showed by Tsar in a matter so 
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important includes everything that can flatter any man, even if he is ambitious in the 
slightest measure.”
44 
Being detached in March 1808 in the Army of Moldova, Kutuzov wrote to his 
wife on March 18, 1808: “...I am full of trouble, I prepare two divisions for march and 
I’m facing  many difficulties, ... I would  have to go also but the worries retain  me 
here,  if  someone  asks  you  about  me  in  Petersburg,  tell  them  that  you  think  I've 
already gone ...”.
45 
Following the official correspondence of Kutuzov on the eve of the Battle of 
Borodino one can notice the firmness to fight a decisive battle with Napoleon and the 
confidence in success, but at the same time, in a letter to his daughter Ana Hitrovo of 
August  19  1812,  he  insisted  that  she  had  to  withdraw  away  from  the  theatre  of 
military  operations  and  to  keep  simultaneously  his  letters  in  the  greatest  secret, 
because if they will be made public, they will bring him the great harm.
46  
Kutuzov  was  known  as  a  notorious  lecher,  this  fact  was  confirmed  by  his 
behaviour during his stay in the Romanian lands. The local nobility and Russian body 
of  officers  were  surprised  by  the  actions  which  were  undertaken  by  the  newly 
commander in chief of Moldovan Army. Kutuzov's first concern  while arriving to 
Bucharest was to find a mistress, according to the memoirs of A.F. Langeron. The 
choice was made in favour of “a child of 14 years” 
47 who “unfortunately” soon she 
dominated him, as happened to all women of all quality who obtained from him any 
advantages both for pleasure and for their family”.
48 “... She was a true lover for him, 
a favourite sultana. She came to him every night and together spent time in front of 
everyone:  the  familiarities  that  degenerated  into  indecency,  revolting  the  honest 
people who were forced to go to him. When he was invited to dinner, it was necessary 
to  invite  Mrs.  Guliano,  after  dinner  they  locked  themselves  into  a  cabinet  for 
intimacy… I saw this puny and shameless creature always near him: at balls, clubs, 
public  places.  She  often  sits  on  knees  of  her  lover  of  70  years  playing  with  his 
decorations and leaving him overwhelmed of her hugs and smile.” Joseph de Maistre 
the  messenger of  the Sardinia  Kingdom to the court of  Petersburg confirmed that 
Kutuzov in place to deal with the peace negotiations was “smitten by a Wallachian, 
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spending all his days and nights with her...”
49  
It seems that  Kutuzov  himself  was  not too bothered by this situation.  On 
April 28, 1812, Kutuzov invited his daughter Elizabeth, who has reached by that 
time  Odessa,  to  visit  Bucharest,  where  “she  will  see  new  faces,  inter  alia,  a 
married woman of 13-14 years, very naive and very pleasant”.
50 It is obvious that 
the status of a “naive and pleasant” woman was not a secret for his daughter, who 
was very attached to her father and as before he informed his daughter about the 
ladies of his entourage.
51 
Even during the time when Russia was at the lock, Kutuzov did not change his 
habits. In his letter to Alexander I from September 20, 1812, the military governor of 
Moscow F. V. Rostopcin reported: “The Prince Kutuzov  no longer exists - no one 
sees him, he is always in a state of lying and sleeping. The soldiers despise and hate 
him. He did not dare do anything, a young, dressed in Cossack uniform occupies all 
his time. ... Kutuzov, as an old gossipy, has lost his head, thinking to do something 
through nothing”.
52 
This  was  broadly  the  old  general  Kutuzov,  appointed  as  the  commander  in 
chief of the Moldovan Army by Alexander I on March 7, 1811. 
Kutuzov arrived in Bucharest on March 31, 1811 and entered on duty the next 
day.
53  By  this  I  would  like  to  emphasize  that  Kutuzov  was  in  the  Army  from 
Moldova, but as I have already mentioned, due to the conflict with A. A. Prozorovski 
he was assigned in Lithuania. The “Moldovan Army” counted about 46,240 people 
when Kutuzov became the leader.
54 Only one fifth of the persons promoted to officer 
grade had military training between1806-1811.
55 
Kutuzov took the lead from General Langeron, who has shown in his memoirs 
a little bit of dismay by the activity of the new commander in chief: “Kutuzov had 
ceased to constrain soon after his arrival. Laziness, as a dominant his quality covered 
everything and  I realized quickly,  how blackguard  he is. Kutuzov  has always  had 
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enough mind, but his defects were more pronounced than his degree of wisdom ...”.
56  
The  abusive  involvement  of  the  supreme  commanders  of  the  “Moldovan 
Army” into the internal affairs of the Romanian countries, including the appointment 
of loyal people in high administrative positions, became a common practice. On April 
3, 1811, Kutuzov ordered to Major-General Stetter, vice-president of the Romanian 
Country Divan to impose Divan to undertake the necessary measures to build very 
soon two bridges over the river Olt,
57 obviously for Russian army needs.  
M.  I.  Kutuzov  excelled  at  getting  involved  into  people  promotion  to  loyal 
administrative  functions  and  at  providing  various  facilities  and  privileges  to  his 
entourage. Thus, in his letter to V. I. Krasno - Milaşevici of November 22, 1811 M. I. 
Kutuzov  insisted  to  appoint  the  officials  who  were  appointed  in  1812  with  his 
approval because of “the current political circumstances.”
 58 General Langeron, in his 
memoirs, noted that Kutuzov during his stay in Bucharest “was no longer ashamed of 
anything, moving towards the most shameful rascals, facing the most revolting degree 
of respect for himself.” And after the detailed description of the group of charlatans 
and opportunists who surrounded Kutuzov in Bucharest, Langeron noted regretfully 
that: “an old man of 68 has appeared in public decorated with all orders of Russia. In 
the midst of this dirty society he spent his life. Nothing was more disgusting than a 
dirty old man and the condemned relations with those people who surrounded him. 
He could refuse nothing to these ‘parasites’. They had all places and all favour.” (...) 
“Kutuzov's Chancellery was also the core of all intrigues. The weak and guilty man 
was teased by all people who were looking to profit of his confidence and once they 
got some trust, they abused with indecency and without remorse… Every one of these 
employees, of these parasites, defendants had a purpose: the desire to obtain a job or 
wealth at any cost”.
59 
According to General Langeron, Count Vorontsov said nastily but well-suited 
that this company lacks the presence of Kutuzov's wife and of the two daughters.
 60 
The abuses committed by the Russian soldiers during the stay of Kutuzov as 
the  commander  in  chief  of  Moldovan  Army  wee  considerable;  this  prompted  the 
Metropolitan Gavriil Banulescu-Bodoni to intervene to clarify or resolve this kind of 
situations.  This  led  to  the  fact  that  relations  between  them  became  tensed  and 
Metropolitan opponents were supported by Kutuzov. It is eloquent in this sense the 
case of Bishop  Ignatius. Metropolitan Gavriil  Banulescu-Bodoni sent P. Kuniţki to 
Bucharest in order to clarify the activity of the Metropolitan. P. Kuniţki discovered a 
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lot  of  irregularities  and  abuses,  and  then  presented  them  in  a  report  to  Gavriil 
Banulescu-Bodoni, who in turn sent it to the Ober-Prosecutor of Synod. Although the 
decision was made to dismiss the Metropolitan Ignatius, Kutuzov not only refused to 
comply but he expelled P. Kuniţki from Bucharest. 
61 
The local authorities and people was in charge of the maintenance of the large 
occupation army. The care for continuous and safe supply of the army imposed the 
Russian  command  to  intervene  periodically  in  order  to  prevent  the  robberies  and 
abuses which could exterminate completely the inhabitants. Kutuzov stated, into the 
disposal given to the General F. F. Erteli at August 10, 1811: “I should pay attention 
not to  have the situation of the country depletion of  grain, in order to prevent the 
circumstances from the last year when people were starving to death.”
62 
The  admiral  P.  V.  Ciceagov  reported  that  after  his  appointment  as  the 
commander  in  chief  of  the  Moldovan  Army,  Alexander  I  gave  him  a  detailed 
memorandum which included the complaints of unfortunate inhabitants of Moldova 
and  Romanian  Country  regarding  the  Kutuzov's  army.  Thereafter,  checking  these 
complaints, he found them absolutely valid and Kutuzov replied to all these requests 
in the following way: “They will remain only with eyes for weeping”.
63 He noted that 
“the  discipline  was  neglected  in  such  a  way  that  robberies  were  committed 
conformably and soldiers took from the merchants everything they needed”. „But you 
should  wonder  of  soldiers’  debauchery”,  Ciceagov  said  while  General  Kutuzov 
thought only of his own pleasures. And moreover, to please his mistresses, he freed 
their friends and favourites from the customs duties.
64 
The  inhabitants  complained  on  one  part  about  the  increasing  taxes, 
requisitions,  records,  benefits  and  on  the  other  part  about  the  arbitrary  abuse, 
robberies and murders committed by Russian soldiers. People left the villages and 
hid themselves into less accessible places. The peasants’ situation was described by 
Langeron as follows: “Unfortunate Romanian peasants were so terribly tortured that 
many  of  them  fled  to  Transylvania.  They  perceived  themselves  as  subprefects 
putting women on coal and whipping children to snatch little money remained after 
their husbands or fathers have fled. ... but none of these killers was punished than 
through  the loss of job but some of them  have even kept it.  In this circumstance 
Kutuzov showed an inexcusable indifference.”
65 Ciceagov passing through Moldova 
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and the Romanian Country remarked that everywhere houses were abandoned and 
the inhabitants were hiding in the forests to escape the authorities’ requisitions and 
soldiers’ persecutions.”
66 
Ecclesiarch Dionysius, a contemporary chronicler, expressed the feelings of the 
inhabitants against an army that came to free them, but which has acted more severely 
than the Ottomans “they were not satisfied with houses and places to fit (...) they even 
stole everything they found”.
67 
This  situation  has  generated  an  attitude  of  hostility  among  the  Russian 
authorities, or as L. Casso said, 'population has lost confidence in our government's 
ability to reduce their sufferings.”
68 The Russian officials admitted in 1813, that this 
country ... robbed and deserted from the military operations of 1806-1810 presents a 
vast and unpopulated wilderness.”
69 
The  tradition  of  robbing  the  peaceful  population  was  deeply  rooted  in  the 
Russian army. The looting of civilians was a big problem during Napoleon's invasion, 
the population was robbed of its own army. Kutuzov mentioned in his letter of August 
18, 1812 to the commander of Muscovite Guard (opolcenie) the General Lieutenant I. 
I. Markov that robberies have taken huge proportions and necessary measures must be 
taken to combat this phenomenon.
70 At the same day, the order no. 2 issued by him as 
commander in chief of  the Russian armies said that  military police captured  more 
than  2,000  deserters.  And  “the  habit  of  dealing  with  robberies,  tolerated  by 
commanders, has influenced the morality of soldier.”
71   
Through his rescript of September 29, 1812 Alexander I requested Kutuzov to 
take the most severe measures to exterminate the phenomenon of people robbing, the 
most criminal vice of a soldier who is obliged to defend his homeland.
72 
If the Russian soldiers, at home,  have robbed their countrymen during harsh 
times for their country, it is easy to imagine what kind of behaviour these foreign 
soldiers had on the occupied territories, such as the Romanian Countries. Meanwhile, 
Kutuzov  showed  a  great  concern  for  arranging  and  careful  treatment  of 
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Transdanubian  colonists  in  the  Romanian  territories  occupied  by  the  Russians.  In 
order to create favourable conditions the Transdanubian colonists were removed from 
the jurisdiction of Divans. A Ward Committee was created for their administration, 
led  by  the  colonists’  curator  -  A.  Koronelli  –  the  state  counsellor.
73  According  to 
Kutuzov's disposal of April 26, 1811, Transdanubian colonists have been freed from 
any  type  of  labour  conscriptions  and  taxes  for  three  years  “with  possibility  of 
extension by few years.”
74 
On July 16, 1811 Kutuzov requested the support of Metropolitan Gavriil with 
regard to the exemption of the colonists established on the monastic lands from the 
Tithe,  for  the  benefit  of  the  owners.  These  quantities  of  grain  were  expected  to 
accumulate in a reserve fund to help the poor colonists managed by A. Koronelli
75 
who was characterized by the General Langeron as: “the worst from the miserable 
and  disgraceful  persons  of  this  dead  ends”.
76  In  March  1812,  more  than  20  000 
families  have  profited  from  the  conditions  created  and  have  established  their 
residence on the left shore of the Danube.
77 
One of  the  tasks set  to  Kutuzov as  the  commander  in chief  of  Moldovan 
Army was the speedy conclusion of peace with Turkey. But, as noted later in the 
court of Petersburg, he did not show enough interest to achieve this task. Besides 
his proverbial inactivity, Kutuzov was in no hurry to conclude the peace because 
he feared being removed from the army command.
78 On April 18, 1812 Kutuzov 
wrote  to  his  wife:  “If thank God  I  will sign  for peace,  I  fear  that  I  will  not  be 
allowed to St. Petersburg. Finally, it seems  I’ll  have  nothing  to do in  the army. 
Thank God the posts are filled by worthy people. All will be done only if there 
will be peace with Turks...”.
79  
As the war against Napoleon was imminent, Alexander requested insistently 
Kutuzov to speedily conclude the peace with Turkey. The case of ex-ambitions on 
the principalities was not mentioned. Thus, in his rescript on March 22, 1812 to 
M. I. Kutuzov, Tsar Alexander I insisted on concluding the peace with Turkey as 
soon  as  possible:  “You  will  do  a  great  service  to  Russia  concluding  a  speedy 
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peace with Porte. I beg you, as a manifestation of love for the motherland to pay 
attention and put your efforts into this goal. You will have eternal glory. There is 
no  time  to  lose  in  this  situation.  Give  up  secondary  activities,  and  with  the 
clairvoyance which characterizes you, assume this important work.” Alexander I 
allowed Kutuzov to accept his own responsibility as an exception, the setting of 
the border on  the Prut  River only if the Ottoman Empire  would agree to sign a 
treaty of alliance with Russia.
80 
Meanwhile, the court's dissatisfaction on  M.  I. Kutuzov  work  had increased 
because  the  matters  did  not  advance  in  the  direction  desired  by  Tsar.  This  is 
confirmed by Langeron who wrote in his memoirs: “On December the negotiations 
did  not  advance.  Petersburg  was  not  content.  There  has  already  been  a  talk  of 
Kutuzov’s recall. His wife sent him the rumours and advised him to establish peace 
before arrival of his successor. She did not know the successor but there was a talk in 
Petersburg that Ciceagov will be.”
81 The rumours about his dismissal made Kutuzov 
more  active  and  he  seriously  began  to  negotiate  with  the  Turks.  As  reported  by 
Lanjeron, Kutuzov summoned him in one of the days, at 7.00 o’clock but usually he 
is available at 10.00 - 11.00 o’clock and  Kutuzov spoke to  him “of  what  he  was 
instructed  to  do,  and  what  he  has  not  yet  succeeded  to  do  and  he  will  lose  his 
reputation and glory if he did not sign this peace”.
82 
Alexander  I,  in  a  discussion  with  Admiral  P.  V.  Ciceagov,  assessed  this 
situation  as  follows:  “...  our  peace  with  Turkey  does  not  advance;  instead  of 
advancing it seems to be going back. The excesses of our troops in Moldova and the 
Romanian Country have exasperated the inhabitants; the negligence and the intrigue 
prevail here. Besides, I do not think that the current commander (General Kutuzov), 
the  author  of  this  situation,  is  able  to  do  something  that  would  require  energy, 
goodwill and rapidity in execution.”
83  
F. V. Rostopcin wrote in his memoirs: “There is no doubt that the peace could 
have been done earlier, but Kutuzov, being convinced that after the peace he will be 
removed from command of the army and ignoring received orders, has considered 
that best for him would be to delay the talks, but when he found out that Ciceagov has 
been appointed in his place, he did not want to give him the honor of ending the war 
and he concluded the peace in three days.”
84 
Alexander's  impatience  and  the  harsh  words  against  M.  I.  Kutuzov,  who 
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delayed  unreasonably  negotiations  with  the  Turks  conformable  to  the  imperial 
court’s opinions, were justified from the perspective of the Napoleonic invasion. In 
this situation, Alexander  decided  to replace  M.  I.  Kutuzov by  the Admiral P.  V. 
Ciceagov who was appointed as the supreme commander of Danube Army, of the 
Black  Sea  fleet  and  general  governor  of  Moldova  and  the  Romanian  Country. 
Sending  P.  V.  Ciceagov  to  replace  M.  I.  Kutuzov,  the  Tsar  handed  him  two 
rescripts: one of April the 5th – if the peace treaty was not signed, by which M. I. 
Kutuzov  was  recalled  to  St.  Petersburg  as  a  member  of  the  State  Council  and 
another from April the 9th – if the treaty has already been signed M. I. Kutuzov was 
invited to the capital to be awarded for his merits.
85 On May 6, 1812 P. V. Ciceagov 
arrived in Bucharest and found out that Kutuzov had signed preliminary documents 
of peace treaty the day before on May 5, he handed him the rescript dated on April 
9, P. V. Ciceagov delayed only one day. 
I mention that 1812 was the year of Kutuzov's glory. Alexander I presented to 
M.  I.  Kutuzov  his  portrait  adorned  with  diamonds
86  for  the  successful  end  of  the 
Rusciuc  operation;  on  October  29,  1811  he  was  granted  the  title  of  Count  for 
“successes in the war against the Turks”,
87 and on July 29 1812, he received honorary 
title of Kniaz (Prince) for “contribution to the end of war and Peace Treaty with the 
Ottoman Empire.”
88 For the battle near Borodino, Alexander I gave to Kutuzov the 
rank of general-field marshal on August 31, 1812,
89 and for the Battle of Smolensk - 
the title of “Smolensk” (Титул Смоленского) on December 6, 1812.
90 In a year M. I. 
Kutuzov has received different titles of nobility, functions and military ranks as have 
never been offered in the previous 67 years. 
It  seems  that  by  granting  titles  of  nobility  and  supreme  military  rank, 
Alexander I demonstrated that he gave up the antipathy towards M. I. Kutuzov. But 
there is a hint: both  Ukases (decree) on giving titles of nobility  had the following 
statement: “and to his heirs”, knowing the fact that Kutuzov had only daughters
91 and 
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could not transmit the nobility title. 
General  Kutuzov,  who  succeeded  through  deceptions  and  guiles,  to  end  the 
long  Russo-Turkish  war  on  favourable  terms  for  Russia,  but  with  serious 
consequences for the Romanian countries, must not be excessively glorified. For the 
Romanians, Kutuzov was nothing more than the supreme commander of the Russian 
army  of  occupation  who  ruthlessly  robbed  the  Romanian  principalities  and 
contributed to the dismemberment of Moldova. 